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I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Supreme Court's adoption of amendments to the Rules of
Professional Conduct from 1991 to date significantly impact the manner in
which Florida lawyers practice the business of law. The scope of this article
will address those amendments adopted by the Florida Supreme Court relat-
ing to chapter 4 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, known as the
Rules of Professional Conduct (the "Rules").
Reported cases during this same time period are replete with decisions
imposing discipline on lawyers who deviate from these Rules. Because this
article must be practically limited in its scope and length, it does not seek
to review every appellate case affected by the Rules during the relevant time
period. Rather, the author intends to review those cases that are particularly
noteworthy for their unique (and sometimes outlandish) fact pattern,
departure from historical interpretation of a particular Rule or, in some
cases, for the precedent they set.
* Shareholder of Atkinson, Diner & Stone, P.A., Hollywood, Fla.; Board Certified Real
Estate Lawyer; J.D., University of Miami, 1978; B.A., University of Florida, 1975; Adjunct
Professor, Barr. University Andreas School of Business; member and former Vice-Chairman
of The Florida Bar Professional Ethics Committee; former Chairman of The Florida Bar
Grievance Committee 17D. Ms. Stone was a recent lecturer at a seminar sponsored by The
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II. AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA BAR RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: 1991-1993
In 1991, the Florida Supreme Court ruled on The Florida Bar's petition
for an amendment to the Rules relating to professional advertising.' The
court approved The Florida Bar's proposal to amend the Rules regulating
advertising with some modifications.' The decision was based on the
doctrine first espoused in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,3 holding that commercial speech is
protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution.4 This doctrine was
subsequently adopted and made applicable to the practice of law by the
United States Supreme Court in Bates v. State Bar.5 The Florida Supreme
Court also adopted chapter 15 of the Rules, which created The Florida Bar's
Standing Committee on Advertising.6 Prior to the decision, issues of
professional advertising were addressed by The Florida Bar's Professional
Ethics Committee.
The Florida Bar re." Amendment to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar7
approved a new rule, Rule 4-1.17, regarding the sale of a law practice. The
supreme court adopted the Rule as proposed by The Florida Bar. The Rule
delineates the procedures and restrictions for the sale of the practice.8 In
the decision, other Rules were also amended.9
In re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar-il-3. I (a) and
Rules of Judicial Administration-2.065 (Legal Aid)10 is significant for its
impact on members of The Florida Bar as well as for its giving substance
to the message of Rule 4-6.1 Pro Bono Public Service. In this decision, the
Supreme Court of Florida considered the recommendations contained in the
Report of the Florida Bar/Florida Bar Foundation Joint Commission on the
I. The Fla. Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating The Fla. Bar- Advertising
Issues, 571 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1990).
2. Id.
3. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
4. Id. at 770.
5. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
6. The Fla. Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating The Fla. Bar-Advertising
Issues, 571 So. 2d at 455.
7. 605 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1992).
8. Id. at 253, 342-44.
9. Id. at 253-54. Other rules that were amended include: Rule 4-5.4(a) Professional
Independence of a Lawyer; Rule 4-5.6 Restrictions on Right to Practice; Rule 4-7.2(n)
Advertising; Rule 4-7.5 Evaluation of Advertisements; and Rule 4-7.8 Lawyer Referral
Services.
10. 598 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1992).
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Delivery of Legal Services to the Indigent in Florida ("Joint Commission"),
filed March 21, 1991." Although the Joint Commission made thirty-one
recommendations, the one controversy and subject of the supreme court's
ruling was Recommendation No. 24, entitled "Voluntary Pro Bono Legal
Services." 12
After a recitation of the importance of legal representation to the
citizens of our state and the role of the lawyer in a free society as a vehicle
for challenge to the constitution, the court recognized that to further this
end, the under represented segments of our society must not only be
represented by government paid lawyers, but by private lawyers as well. 3
The court went on to approve Recommendation No. 24 with modifications
as set forth in the decision. 4 While the court in an earlier decision held
that every lawyer in the State of Florida has an obligation to perform pro
bono services,'" the 1992 decision reaffirmed the court's reluctance to
mandate pro bono services. 6 Several elements of Recommendation No. 24
also directly relate to amending Rule 4-6.1 to incorporate the voluntary pro
bono plan in detail.' 7
As directed by the Florida Supreme Court," the Florida Bar Commis-
sion proposed pro bono rules and, in Amendments to Rules Regulating The
Florida Bar--1-3. l(a) and Rules of Judicial Administration--2.065 (Legal
Aid),'9 the proposed rules were adopted by the supreme court, with
modifications.2" Consistent with its previous ruling, the supreme court
emphasized that "the rules are aspirational rather than mandatory, and the
failure to meet the aspirational standards set forth in the rules will not
constitute an offense subject to discipline."'" However, an attorney's
11. Id. at 41.
12. Id.
13. id. at 43.
14. Id.
15. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Fla. Bar- 1-3. 1 (a) and Rules of Judicial
Admin.-2.065 (Legal Aid), 573 So. 2d 800, 801 (Fla. 1990).
16. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Fla. Bar-l-3.1(a) and Rules of Judicial
Admin.-2.065 (Legal Aid), 598 So. 2d 41, 47 (Fla. 1992). Both Chief Justice Barkett and
Justice Kogan dissented with opinions favoring mandatory pro bono service. Justice Kogan's
dissent is especially noteworthy for its historical perspective. See id. at 55 (Kogan, J.,
dissenting).
17. Id. at 47.
18. Id. at 44.
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failure to complete the report form provided for in the Rules will constitute
an offense subject to discipline." As a result of this decision, Rule 4-6.1
was deleted and the new Rule 4-6.1 Pro Bono Public Service was adopted
in its place.23 This decision also amended the Comments to Rule 4-6.2 and
added Rule 4-6.5 Voluntary Pro Bono Plan. 24  The reader is urged to
review this historic and controversial decision in detail.
In The Florida Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida
Bar,25 The Florida Bar and sixty individual practitioners petitioned the
court to amend the Rules to include provisions relating to improper
discrimination.26 The basis for the petition was the study conducted by the
Florida Supreme Court Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission and the
Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission (together or
singularly the "Bias Study Commission").27 The Bias Study Commission
found numerous problems faced by minorities and women in the legal
profession. 2' Based upon these findings, The Florida Bar and the individu-
al petitioners jointly recommended to the court an amendment to
Rule 4-8.4(d) to prohibit discriminatory practices by members of the Bar.29
In adopting the amendment to Rule 4-8.4(d), the court recognized that the
proscribed conduct must be limited to the lawyers' practice of law in order
to "ensure that the First Amendment rights of lawyers are not unduly
burdened."3°  The amendment to Rule 4-8.4(d) takes effect January 1,
1994.
The Florida Bar also petitioned for a new rule, Rule 4-8.7, and the
individual petitioners submitted for consideration a new rule, Rule 4-8.4(h),
the thrust of both such proposed rules being the prohibition of discriminato-
22. Id. The court stated that "accurate reporting is essential for evaluating this program
and for determining what services are being provided under the program." Id.
23. Amendments to Rules Regulating The Fla. Bar-l-3.1(a) and Rules of Judicial
Administration-2.065 (Legal Aid), 18 Fla. L. Weekly at S351-52.
24. Id. at S352. Rule 4-6.5 authorizes and outlines the requirements and responsibilities
in connection with the development of various Pro Bono Legal Service committees under
Rule 4-6.5 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. See id.; see also FLA. BAR R. PROF.
CONDUCT 4-6.5 (1993).
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ry employment practices by the lawyer.3 Both proposed rules were
rejected by the supreme court on several grounds, including the court's lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of employment practices and the fact
that both federal and state laws already provide for adequate protections and
procedures relating to employment discrimination.32
In The Florida Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida
Bar,33 the supreme court adopted a new rule, Rule 3-4.8, which requires
a member of The Florida Bar to respond to grievance investigations, subject
to assertion by the attorney of the doctrine of privilege, immunity or
disability, as applicable. 34 The supreme court also approved a new rule,
Rule 3-5. 1(j), known as the Disciplinary Resignation Rule, which provides
that an attorney may resign from The Florida Bar in lieu of defending
against allegations of disciplinary violations.3" Further amendments to
chapter 3 were made to conform the Rules to the Disciplinary Resignation
Rule.36
In the same decision, the supreme court adopted an amendment to
Rule 4-7.2 Advertising with respect to disclosures to be contained within
lawyer referral service advertisements.37 Also, Rule 4-8.4(g) was created
to conform to the new Rule 3-4.8 as the former defines misconduct as a
lawyer's failure to respond in writing to disciplinary proceedings.38
III. OVERVIEW OF CASE LAW
The following review of cases is by no means an exhaustive account
of every reported case dealing with an ethical violation or with the interplay
between the Rules and civil causes of action. This review is intended,
however, to discuss those decisions that provide Florida lawyers with
guidance as to ethical issues that commonly confront them in daily practice.
In Pressley v. Farley,39 the court affirmed previous decisions that held
that a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct does not create legal
31. Id. at S393.
32. Id. at S394.
33. 621 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1993) [hereinafter 1993 Bar Amendments].
34. Id. at 1033-34. See FLA. BAR R. DisC. 3-4.8 (1993).
35. 1993 Bar Amendments, 621 So. 2d at 1036; see FLA. BARR. DisC. 3-5.10) (1993).
36. 1993 Bar Amendments, 621 So. 2d at 1036-43.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1032.
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duties on lawyers nor do they constitute negligence per se.4" The court did
state, however, that a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct can be
used as evidence of negligence.41 In another case involving the interplay
between professional negligence and the Rules of Professional Conduct, The
Florida Bar v. Morse,4 2 the supreme court, in affirming a referee's
recommended discipline against an attorney, stated that an attorney who
participates in a scheme to hide his partner's malpractice from their client
is guilty of an ethical violation.43 In addition, the opinion cautions that
when an attorney discovers there has been malpractice committed, a conflict
of interest arises and accordingly, the attorney must advise the client to seek
other legal counsel.44 The decision further instructs the lawyer to advise
a client that malpractice has been committed by the lawyer or one within the
lawyer's firm.45
In The Florida Bar v. Littman,46 the court based its holding on a
premise that is the converse of Pressley. In Littman, a disciplinary case, the
supreme court reversed its long-standing line of demarcation between
negligent conduct serving as the basis for a malpractice cause of action and
as a basis for a disciplinary action under the Rules.47 The supreme court
questioned its previous decision of Littman in The Florida Bar v. Neale,48
"in light of present public policy and the black letter rules adopted in 1987,"
and found Littman guilty of a violation of Rule 4-1.1 based upon profes-
sional negligence.49
In the Littman case, the attorney's negligence was the failure to include
an affidavit in his motion to change residential custody in a domestic
40. Id. at 161; Oberon Invs., N.V. v. Angel, Cohen & Rogovin, 492 So. 2d 1113, 1114
n.2 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986), quashed on other grounds, 512 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1987).
41. Pressley, 579 So. 2d at 161.
42. 587 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1991).
43. Id. at 1121.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 612 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1993).
47. Id.
48. 384 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1980). In Neale, the court drew a line between negligence
and violation of the then Code of Professional Responsibility on the basis that disciplinary
action could not be used as a substitute for a malpractice action. Id. at 1265.
49. Littman, 612 So. 2d at 582 n.3. The current version of Rule 4-1.1 states:
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.
FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.1 (1993).
[Vol. 1 8
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matter.5" The client dismissed Littman, retained the services of another
attorney, and obtained temporary custody of his daughter.5' Accordingly,
the court noted that the negligent actions of Littman did not result in any
real damages to his client.52 However, in finding that Littman was guilty
of violating Rule 4-1.1, and given his prior disciplinary record,53 the court
affirmed the referee's recommendation of a public reprimand. 4 This case
is especially noteworthy not only for its ruling, but also for the fact that the
negligence of the attorney in question was minor in nature resulting in no
real damage to the client,55 whereas, the previous Neale case involved an
attorney whose negligent conduct resulted in irreparable damage to his
client. 6 While the Littman case was decided under different disciplinary
guidelines than Neale,57 the Littman case is stunning, nonetheless, for its
strict interpretation of Rule 4-1.1 and its willingness to impose discipline for
conduct that, in a malpractice action, may not even yield the client an award
for damages.58
In Halberg v. WM Chanfrau,59 the court provided an interesting
analysis of the application of Rule 4-1.5, the Rule relating to division of
fees between lawyers of different firms.60 The court analyzed the language
of a written fee referral agreement and provided insight into the enforceabil-
ity of referral agreements based upon compliance with the Rule.6'
50. Littmnan, 612 So. 2d at 582.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 583.
53. In a separate matter, the attorney failed to send copies of documents to opposing
counsel before sending them to the trial judge and misrepresented factual matters resulting
in a report of minor misconduct. Id. at 582 n.2.
54. Id. at 583.
55. Littinan, 612 So. 2d at 583.
56. Neale, 384 So. 2d at 1265. In Neale, the attorney, Neale, misinterpreted a statute
of limitations to be longer than it was, took a voluntary non-suit, and thus foreclosed his
client's ability to refile the action. As referred to previously, the supreme court, however,
declined to characterize this act of negligence as a disciplinary violation. Id.
57. The Neale case was decided based upon the previous Code of Professional
Responsibility, disciplinary Rules 6-l0l(A)(2) and 6-l01(A)(3), which stated, "[a] lawyer
shall not: . . . (2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him." Id. at 1264 n.I. However, it may be argued
that there is little substantive distinction between the Rules under the former Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility and Rule 4-1.1, as both seek to address incompetent representation by
a lawyer. See id.
58. Littmnan, 612 So. 2d at 583.
59. 613 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
60. Id.




Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
In Halberg, the referring attorney brought an action against the
receiving attorney to recover fees.62 The circuit court granted summary
judgment against the referring attorney.63 The district court reversed and
remanded based upon its interpretation of Rule 4-1.5(g).6 4 The subject of
the case was a written agreement that gave the referring attorney twenty-five
percent (25%) and the receiving attorney seventy-five percent (75%) of the
fees.65 In the lower court, the decision turned on an interpretation of this
provision in light of the language of Rule 4-1.5(g)(1). 66 Even though the
attorneys' written agreement did not precisely track the language of
Rule 4-1.5(g)(2)(a), the court decided that the referral agreement constituted
a written agreement with the client where disclosure of the division of fees
was made and that the language of the agreement was sufficient to prove
that the referring attorney had assumed a legal responsibility for the
representation of the client.67 Therefore, because the agreement fell within
the purview of Rule 4-1.5(g)(2)(a), there was no requirement that the
referring lawyer actually perform compensable legal services.68
In Lee v. Florida Department of Insurance & Treasurer,69 the court
adopted the rationale found in Pressley that a violation of the Rules of
62. Id. at 601.
63. Id. at 602.
64. Halberg, 613 So. 2d at 602. The current Rule 4-1.5(g) states:
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (f)(4)(D), a division of fee between
lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if the total fee is
reasonable and:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer; or
(2) by written agreement with the client:
(A) each lawyer assumes joint legal responsibility for the representation and
agrees to be available for consultation with the client; and
(B) the agreement fully discloses that a division of fees will be made and the
basis upon which the division of fees will be made.
FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.5 (1993).
65. Halberg, 613 So. 2d at 601.
66. The controversial language in the agreement was as follows: "Provided, however,
that said fees 'may' be readjusted between CHANFRAU & CHANFRAU and REFERRING
ATTORNEY based upon the extent of time and services rendered or to be rendered to said
client; . . ." Id. (emphasis added). The lower court interpreted the word "may" to mean
"shall" and therefore concluded that the fee agreement was not enforceable because the




69. 586 So. 2d 1185 (Fla.lst Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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Professional Conduct does not create any civil cause of action.7° In Lee,
an appeal from an administrative order, the court disqualified an attorney
representing the Florida Department of Insurance and Treasurer. This
disqualification was based upon an agreement signed by the attorney's
former law firm that set forth that the firm could not represent the
Department of Insurance against the petitioner, Lee."
The Department of Insurance argued that the restricting agreement was
against public policy.72 The hearing officer in the administrative proceed-
ing cited Rule 4-5.6 in support of the decision to deny the motion to
disqualify counsel. The court stated that neither Rule 4-5.6"3 nor any other
Rule could be used as a basis for invalidating a private contractual
provision.74 The court determined that the ethical issue was whether the
attorney, who was a former associate of the law firm restricted in its
representation of the Department of Insurance, could ethically (and legally)
represent the Department in light of the presumptively valid agreement
which prevented the law firm from disclosing any confidences it had learned
from its client.75 This issue and its related concern is expressly recognized
and supported by the Rules.76
In rendering its decision, the court moved the focus of its rationale
from Rule 4-5.6 to Rules 4-1.7, 4-1.9 and 4-1.10, all of which deal with
client confidences and the obligations regarding such being imputed to any
employee of a law firm.77 Accordingly, the court enforced the terms of the
agreement based upon the clear intent of such agreement to prevent the use
or disclosure of confidential information gained during the lawyer's previous
employment.7
70. Id. at 1188.
71. Id. at 1187.
72. Id.
73. Presently, Rule 4-5.6 states:
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer
to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning
benefits upon retirement; or
(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part
of the settlement of a controversy between private parties.
FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-5.6 (1993).
74. Lee, 586 So. 2d at 1188.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1189 nn.4-5 (citing FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.6, 4-1.9 (1990)).
77. Id. at 1188-90.
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In Dean v. Dean,79 the issue turned on whether an attorney-client
relationship was established to permit the attorney to invoke the privilege
provided by section 90.502 of the Florida Statutes."° Recognizing that
both section 90.502 and Rule 4-1.6 codify the common law rule of
privilege, the court also considered Rule 4-1.6 in its ruling.8 Finding that
an attorney-client relationship had been established, the court recited a
historical review of the doctrine of privilege and the cases dealing with
same. 2 The court concluded that, notwithstanding that a fee was not paid
79. 607 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
80. Id. at 497. See also section 90.502 of the Florida Statutes, which currently provides
in pertinent part:
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to
be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation.
(b) A "client" is any person, public officer, corporation, association, or other
organization or entity, either public or private, who consults a lawyer with the
purpose of obtaining legal services or who is rendered legal services by a
lawyer.
(c) A "communication" between a lawyer and client is "confidential" if it is
not intended to be disclosed to a third person other than:
1. Those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of legal services
to the client.
2. Those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.
FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1991).
81. Dean, 607 So. 2d at 497 n.4. Rule 4-1.6 now sets forth in pertinent part:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client
except as stated in subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), unless the client consents after
disclosure to the client.
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information to the extent the lawyer believes
necessary:
(I) to prevent a client from committing a crime; or
(2) to prevent a death or substantial bodily harm to another.
(c) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer believes
necessary:
(I) to serve the client's interest unless it is information the client specifically
requires not to be disclosed;
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and client;
(3) to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved;
(4) to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client; or
(5) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.6 (1993).
82. Dean, 607 So. 2d at 496-99.
[Vol. 18
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and that the attorney in question did not use normal procedures in opening
a client file, an attorney-client relationship had been established.83 The
existence of this relationship was based upon the evidence that the client
sought out the attorney for legal advice and that the legal advice was
sufficient to establish the relationship, regardless of whether there was a
controversy or court proceeding. 4
While most practitioners would not countenance an uncooperative
nature in responding to a grievance complaint, at least one attorney in 1992
did so and was disciplined as a result. In The Florida Bar v. Vaughn, 5
Vaughn petitioned for a review of a referee's finding of guilt and sanctions
against him.86 It is interesting to note that the referee recommended that
the attorney be found not guilty as to alleged violations of three substantive
Rule violations, which were the initial subject of the disciplinary proceed-
ings. 7 However, because of the attorney's lack of cooperation in the
disciplinary proceedings, the referee found Vaughn guilty of a violation of
Rule 4-8.1(b). 8  Vaughn argued that unless the referee found him guilty
of the substantive Rule violations, the Bar could not issue sanctions against
him because of his failure to cooperate. 9 Vaughn's failure to cooperate
included failing to respond to the Bar's request to reply to the complaint,
failing to appear at a hearing, failing to communicate with the Bar that he
was involved in a criminal trial during the grievance hearing, and failing to
appear in person for the Referee Trial.9"
83. Id.
84. Id. at 499-500.
85. 608 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1992).
86. Id. at 18.
87. Id. at 19.
88. Id. Currently, Rule 4-8.1 states in pertinent part:
An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar
admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the
person to have arisen in the matter or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful
demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that
this nile does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule
4-1.6
FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-8.1 (1993).
89. Vaughn, 608 So. 2d at 19.
90. Id. at 20. However, Vaughn did attend the hearing by telephone after he was




Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
The Vaughn case was one of first impression as the court itself
acknowledged.9' The court held that, based upon the evidence of a
continuing pattern of not cooperating or participating in the disciplinary
proceedings, Vaughn was guilty of a violation of Rule 4-8.1(b).92  The
court did go on to note that the obligation to cooperate is subject to the
guarantees of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, but
if an attorney was going to use the Fifth Amendment as a reason for non-
cooperation, then the attorney should do so by way of a response to the
Bar's inquiries.93 In expressing the opinion that an attorney has a "profes-
sional duty to respond courteously and to cooperate with a bar disciplinary
proceeding," the court supports the position that the integrity of the
disciplinary proceedings mandates cooperation by the professional, which in
turn furthers the public's confidence in the self-regulation of the profes-
sion.94 The court did, however, reduce the discipline recommended by the
referee from a suspension to a public reprimand.95
Of course, Vaughn would have been cited for a violation of the new
Rule 4-8.4(g) had the case been decided after the adoption of the new Rule
on July 1, 1993. The adoption of the new Rule makes it unequivocal that
failure to cooperate in disciplinary proceedings is a violation of the Rules.96
There is perhaps no more fertile ground for ethical violations than the
conflict-of-interest Rules. 97 The temptation of representing more than one
client in a transaction or more than one party in litigation is ever present for
many practitioners and, then again, some practitioners are "knee-deep" in a
conflict before it becomes apparent. The number of reported cases
involving conflict issues bears out the fact that these issues are some of the
most frequently litigated. These cases often deal with motions to disqualify
opposing counsel, and may not invoke the Rules in the decision.98
91. Id.
92. Id. at 21; see also FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-8.1(b) (1993).
93. Vaughn, 608 So. 2d at 20.
94. Id. at 21.
95. Id.
96. See FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-8.4(g) (1993).
97. Id. 4-1.7 to 4-1.10 (1993).
98. See, e.g., Spinelli v. Rodes-Roper-Love Ins. Agency, Inc., 613 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (deciding that the law firm that caused the conflict resulting in its
disqualification would not charge a former client for contesting such disqualification because
the law firm itself caused the conflict by hiring a lawyer who had previously worked on the
case for the opposing party); Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 611 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1992) (focusing on the issue of when an attorney-client relationship is established for
purposes of disqualification); General Elec. Real Estate Corp. v. S.A. Weisberg, Inc., 605 So.
[Vol. 18
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However, in another case involving a motion to disqualify a law firm,
Birdsall v. Crowngap, Ltd," the court invoked Rule 4-1.10(b)' in its
decision, quashing the trial court's order, which denied the petitioner's
Motion to Disqualify the respondent's law firm.' The rationale of
Pressley v. Farley is present in Birdsall, as the Rules were referred to for
their guidance in the court's decision involving a civil action motion to
disqualify an attorney. 1 2 The Birdsall case is also interesting to note
because the disqualified attorney was in fact isolated from his new law
firm's representation of the party opposing his previous client.'0 3 The
court analyzed the "wall of isolation," also known as the "Chinese wall,"
exception contained in Rule 4-1.11(a),'0 4 which deals with government
attorneys, and thejustification for the distinction between Rule 4-1.11 (a) and
Rule 4-1.10(b).'0° The court, in following previous decisions, rejected the
theory that the "Chinese wall" employed by the law firm in isolating the
attorney from the action was adequate to prevent the disqualification. 06
2d 955 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (deciding that an attorney cannot be disqualified based
merely on an opponent's subjective thoughts that the attorney's firm had been representing
him).
99. 575 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
100. Rule 4-1.10 currently provides:
When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly
represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that
lawyer or a firm with which the lawyer was associated, had previously
represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to that person and
about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 4-1.6 and
4-1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.10 (1993).
101. Birdsall, 575 So. 2d at 232.
102. Id.; see Pressley v. Farley, 579 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App. 1991).
103. Birdsall, 575 So. 2d at 232.
104. Rule 4-1.11 presently states:
A lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in
which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or
employee, unless the appropriate government agency consents after consultation.
No lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly
undertake or continue to represent in such a matter unless:
(1) the disqualified lawyer is screened from participation in the matter and is
directly apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government agency to
enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.
FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.11(a) (1993).
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The decision is also consistent with the comment to Rule 4-1.10, which
indicates that application of the Rule must be based on a "functional
analysis" involving issues of confidentiality and adverse positions." 7
Another case in which the court analyzed whether a law firm acquired
confidential information from a new attorney who represented an opposing
party in the same case is Nissan Motor Corp. v. Orozco.'0 8 In Nissan, the
appellate court denied the defendant's petition for certiorari and, in so doing,
deferred to the circuit court's factual determination that the lawyer's firm
did not acquire confidential information from his former law firm's client
that would in turn be imputed to the balance of the lawyer's new firm. °9
After a careful analysis of the distinctions between Rule 4-1.9" and
Rule 4-1.10,"' the court concluded that the irrebuttable presumption that
confidences are disclosed to an attorney during the course of the attorney-
client relationship is applicable only to Rule 4-1.9 and is not applicable to
Rule 4-1.10, which deals with imputed disqualification." 2  The analysis
in Nissan is consistent with both Birdsall and the comment to
Rule 4-1.10.'"3
In The Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion-Nonlawyer Preparation of
Living Trusts," 4 the Florida Supreme Court addressed an unauthorized
practice of law issue involving corporations and non-lawyers who draft
107. FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.10 cmt. (1993).
108. 595 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 605 So. 2d 1265 (Fla.
1992).
109. Id. at 241.
110. Rule 4-1.9 now provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(a) represent another person in the same or substantially related matter in
which that person's interest are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the
former client except as Rule 4-1.6 would permit with respect to a client or when
information has become generally known.
FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.9 (1993).
111. In its present form, Rule 4-1.10 discusses the following topics: (a) "Imputed
Disqualification of All Lawyers in Firm;" (b) "Former Clients of Newly Associated Lawyer;"
(c) "Representing Interests Adverse to Clients of Formerly Associated Lawyer;" and (d)
"Waiver of Conflict." FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.10 (1993).
112. Nissan Motor Corp., 595 So. 2d at 242.
113. The comment recognizes and dismisses a per se rule of disqualification of a law
firm in the instances when lawyers move between firms, recognizing that the court must
analyze the issues of imputed disqualification based upon the facts of each case. FLA. BAR
R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.10 cmt. (1993)
114. 613 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1992).
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living trusts. The court recognized that a lawyer who works for the
corporation selling the living trusts may have an inherent conflict of interest
based on Rule 4-1.7(b) and Rule 4-1.8(f)."' Accordingly, the court
admonished that any lawyer who reviews, oversees the execution of, and
funds a living trust document should be independent counsel paid by the
client for whom the trust is prepared and not employed by the corporation
seeking to sell the living trusts.'6
In The Florida Bar v. Kramer,"7 The Florida Bar brought a disciplin-
ary proceeding against an attorney who had loaned his client money to
conclude a purchase at a foreclosure sale." 8 Rather than securing the loan
with a note and mortgage on the property, the attorney had the client
execute a deed. The attorney failed to advise the client of the nature of the
transaction, the client possessed only a limited reading ability and, further,
the client thought that he was giving his attorney a mortgage, not a deed.
The court held that the attorney had violated Rules 4-1.7(b), 4-1.7(c) and
4-1.8(a) and issued a public reprimand." 9 Kramer is important for its
lesson to practitioners that any business dealing between a lawyer and the
lawyer's client is inherently subject to conflict-of-interest problems,
notwithstanding the integrity and best intentions of the lawyer in dealing
with the client. 2 ' A lawyer must be extraordinarily cautious in dealing
with a client in such circumstances.
Perhaps the most telling example of a strict interpretation of the Rules
is found in The Florida Bar v. Belleville.12 1 In this case, Belleville was
the only attorney in a business transaction between his client and another
individual, Mr. Cowan, who was an elderly man with little education.
Belleville's client retained him to close on an agreement for the purchase of
property owned by Mr. Cowan. It was undisputed that the terms of the
115. Id, at 428. The current version of Rule 4-1.7 proscribes the duty of lawyers to
avoid limitations on their independent professional judgment. FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT
4-1.7(b) (1993). Rule 4-1.8 dictates the conditions under which a lawyer is permitted to
accept compensation for one other than the client. Id. 4-1.8().
116. The Fla. Bar re Advisory Opinion--- Nonlawyer Preparation of Living Trusts, 613
So. 2d at 428; see also Jenkins v. Harris Ins., Inc., 572 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (providing a basic analysis of Rule 4-1.9, the former client conflict of interest rule).
117. 593 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1992). Kramer provides illustrations of the results of a
practitioner's entering into a business agreement with a client and the potential conflict of
interest such an agreement produces.
118. Id at 1040.
119. Id. at 1042.
120. Id. at 1041.
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agreement overwhelmingly favored Belleville's client. The documents
prepared by Belleville provided for the sale of Mr. Cowan's residence,
notwithstanding the fact that both Belleville's client and Mr. Cowan had
negotiated only for the sale of an apartment building. 2
Belleville is interesting because the trial court was undecided as to
whether Belleville knowingly participated in the egregious actions of his
client or merely followed his client's instructions without question."'
Belleville drafted the documents and included Mr. Cowan's residence in the
sale. The promissory note for payment received by Mr. Cowan of the
purchase price was unsecured by a mortgage. The note also contained other
favorable terms for Belleville's client. Furthermore, the facts substantiated
that the significance of the documents were not explained to Cowan and that
Belleville did not attend the closing, having sent a paralegal in his place.
Subsequent to the closing, Belleville's client attempted to evict Mr. Cowan
from his home. 4
In the disciplinary proceedings, the referee recommended no discipline
because Belleville was not the attorney for Mr. Cowan. 5 The Board of
Governors of The Florida Bar appealed the decision of the referee. 6 In
finding Belleville guilty of an ethical violation, the court made several
analyses that should bode as a warning to all practitioners.' The court
found that Belleville should have been suspicious about the documents
because they were so one-sided and held that when an attorney is the only
attorney in a transaction, the attorney must explain that he is representing
the other party and must further explain the material terms of the documents
that the attorney has drafted. 2' Specifically, the court stated that "[w]hen
the transaction is as one-sided as that of the present case, counsel preparing
the documents is under an ethical duty to make sure that an unrepresented
party understands the possible detrimental effect of the transaction and the
fact that the attorney's loyalty lies with the client alone."'2 9 The court
concluded that Belleville's violations were especially serious in light of the
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fact that he had previously been disciplined for an ethical violation and
therefore the court suspended Belleville for thirty days.130
Practitioners may draw some small comfort in the footnote to Belleville
that the court is limiting its decision to the facts of the case and does not
intend to require an attorney who prepares closing documents to be present
to explain documents to the parties.' In Belleville, because the docu-
ments were so favorable to the attorney's client, the court believed it
necessary for the attorney to explain the legal ramifications of the docu-
ments.'32 However, Belleville offers little guidance to the sole practitioner
in a transaction who, in explaining the "possible detrimental effect of the
transaction" to the unrepresented party, may in fact be violating the
attorney's duty of loyalty to his own client. At the very least, the Belleville
case once again illustrates how imperative it is for the attorney to obtain a
written acknowledgment by the unrepresented party that the attorney is only
representing the attorney's own client and that the unrepresented party has
the right to seek independent legal counsel.'33
The foregoing overview of the cases since 1991 is not intended to be
an exhaustive review of each and every case involving a violation of the
Rules. Unfortunately, the published cases involving discipline of Florida
practitioners are far too numerous. The reader is urged to periodically
review the Rules and their comments and the practitioner is cautioned that
when in doubt about one's own actions, guidance may further be delivered
by The Florida Bar's Professional Ethics Committee and its capable counsel.
130. Id.
131. Belleville, 591 So. 2d at 172 n.2.
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